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NOTES 




In a recent year, $72.3 billion in consumer debt, consisting of 
credit cards, medical, utility, auto, and mortgage debt, was 
purchased by the expanding debt-buying industry.1  Debt buyers 
generally purchase this debt for “pennies on the dollar,” but will 
then turn around and attempt to collect the full amount from the 
consumer.2  In doing so, debt buyers utilize abusive and illegal 
tactics, which include harassing consumers and their families.3 
To protect consumers from such abusive practices, Congress 
enacted the far-reaching and all-encompassing Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)4 to regulate the ever- 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. 
John’s University School of Law. 
1 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING 
INDUSTRY 7 (2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf (describing debt-
buying statistics for 2008). 
2 Ann Carrns, Debt Collectors to Pay $61 Million in Consumer Refunds and 
Amend Their Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/ 
10/your-money/debt-collectors-to-pay-61-million-in-consumer-refunds-and-amend-th 
eir-practices.html. 
3 Id. (“In July, JPMorgan Chase agreed to pay $136 million to settle charges 
that it had used illegal tactics to pursue delinquent credit card borrowers.”); see also 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Debt Collection, Consumer Information, http://www.consumer. 
ftc.gov/articles/0149-debt-collection. 
4 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012) (“It is the purpose 
of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 
collectors . . . and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against 
debt collection abuses.”). 
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expanding debt collection industry.5  Congress sought to deter 
illegal debt collection activities by providing consumers with a 
private right of action against offending debt collectors.6 
Yet, the application of the FDCPA in the context of 
bankruptcy is in dispute.  Particularly, it is debated as to 
whether debtors in bankruptcy retain their private right of action 
under the FDCPA against debt collectors who have filed an 
improper proof of claim.7  In these contexts, the Bankruptcy Code 
arguably overlaps and conflicts with the FDCPA in terms of 
remedies offered and procedural aspects that debt collectors must 
abide by.8 
For years, the majority of courts facing this issue, including 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Eighth 
Circuits, have taken the position that consumer FDCPA claims 
are to be limited or precluded altogether as the supplementation 
of the FDCPA is unnecessary, even detrimental, to the 
Bankruptcy Code.9  However, the Eleventh Circuit, in departing 
from this trend and allowing consumer FDCPA claims, was 
5 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 1692f (2012) (declaring open-ended 
prohibitions on debt collector conduct and mandatory disclosure requirements on 
their communications). 
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012) (creating a private right of action for consumers 
against “debt collector[s] who fail to comply” with the regulations of the FDCPA). 
7 Both courts and commentators are divided on this issue. See James J. Haller 
& Tara Twomey, Debt Collectors Should Not Get a Free Pass in Bankruptcy, 34 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 11, 30 (2015) (arguing that FDCPA claims should be allowed in 
bankruptcy). But see, Brittany M. Dant, Comment, Down the Rabbit Hole: Crawford 
v. LVNV Funding, LLC Upends the Role of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 66 MERCER L. REV. 1067, 1085 (2015) (arguing that FDCPA
claims should not be allowed and that debtors should resort to the remedies under
the Bankruptcy Code).
8 See Dant, supra note 7, at 1080 (discussing how the Bankruptcy Code already 
provides remedies for situations where a debt collector files an invalid proof of 
claim). 
9 In re Gatewood, 533 B.R. 905 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015) (limiting the applicability 
of the FDCPA to deceptive proofs of claim only); Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
276 F.3d 502, 511 (9th Cir. 2002); Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 
96 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that consumer FDCPA claims are precluded because 
underlying purpose of FDCPA is not implicated in bankruptcy); In re Chaussee, 399 
B.R. 225, 227 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008). 
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motivated by the negative implications of allowing debt collectors 
to utilize certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to the 
disadvantage of unrepresented debtors.10 
This Note seeks to offer additional justifications and expand 
upon the Eighth Circuit’s intermediate approach in harmonizing 
both federal statutes by also extending certain exemptions with 
the FDCPA to apply to proofs of claim in bankruptcy.  Part I 
examines the relevant legislative intent and procedural aspects 
of both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA.  Part II 
summarizes the various approaches that courts take to the 
problem and their rationale behind their decision.  Part III 
considers several justifications for limiting consumer 
enforcement of the FDCPA in the bankruptcy context.  Finally, 
Part IV proposes that, to synchronize both the FDCPA and 
Bankruptcy Code, courts should extend exemptions within the 
FDCPA to include proofs of claim and hold that filing a proof of 
claim for a stale debt, without misrepresentation and similar 
deceptive practices, does not constitute a violation of the FDCPA. 
I. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE AND FDCPA 
A. Bankruptcy Code
Although the Bankruptcy Code provides ample protection to
debtors, it was not designed to eliminate abusive collection 
activities.  Rather, Congress’s intent was to design a “whole 
system under federal control which is designed to bring together 
and adjust all of the rights and duties of creditors and 
[embarrassed] debtors alike.”11  Further, bankruptcy courts are 
the sole forum for asserting a proof of claim.  Accordingly, the 
Bankruptcy Code provides for the procedural aspects of filing a 
proof of claim, objecting to it, and obtaining relief for any bad 
faith conduct.12 
10 See Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(finding that the automatic allowance provision of the Bankruptcy Code allows 
creditors to take advantage of unsophisticated debtors). 
11 Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 231 (quoting MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, 
Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
12 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–02 (2012); Adina L. Pollan, Crawford v. LVNV Funding, 
LLC: The Interplay Between the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA, 89 FLA. B.J. 58 
(2015) (stating that past bankruptcy practice and explicit Bankruptcy Code 
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1. Purpose of the Bankruptcy Code Is To Adjust Rights of
Creditors and Debtors Alike
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a neutral
plane for both debtors and creditors to come together for a court-
regulated resolution.  This is accomplished by the automatic stay 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code, which operates as a freeze on 
creditor collection activity.13  By doing this, the Bankruptcy 
Code’s automatic stay provision protects both debtors and 
creditors. 
The automatic stay provision grants many benefits to the 
debtor.  Its primary protection is that it implements an instant 
freeze upon any collection activity.14  Additionally, its scope is 
broad and encompasses any collection activity against debtors or 
their estate.15  Accordingly, it gives a “breathing spell” to debtors 
by operating as a shield so that the debtor can attempt 
repayment or a reorganization plan without adverse actions by 
creditors.16  Further, as part of the fundamental form of 
protection for debtors, violation of the automatic stay may subject 
creditors to “actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, 
and, in appropriate circumstances . . . punitive damages.”17  Some 
courts have even extended “actual damages” to include emotional 
injury damages.18  In addition, this private right of action is not 
the only form of relief given to the debtor; it is considered a 
supplement to the debtor’s right to also seek civil contempt.19  As 
such, debtors are offered many options for which they may seek 
relief for any violation of the automatic stay. 
provisions left remedy for fraudulent and defective claims to be addressed under the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
13 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
14 See id. 
15 See § 362(a)(2). 
16 Sternberg v. Johnston, 595 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the stay 
operates as a shield to the debtor allowing them a breathing spell). 
17 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). 
18 See Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir. 1999). 
19 See In re Kutumian, No. 13-14675-B-7, 2014 WL 2024789, at *10 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. May 15, 2014) (“[Section] 362(h)’s introduction ‘was meant to supplement, not 
replace, the civil contempt remedy.’ ”). 
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In addition, the automatic stay similarly protects creditors’ 
interests, too.  Since creditor collection activity has been halted, 
it essentially prevents any opportunistic attempts by other 
creditors to gain an unfair advantage with respect to obtaining 
payment for their claims.20 
Accordingly, it can be inferred that the legislative intent 
behind the Bankruptcy Code is to create a neutral forum for 
debtors and creditors to come together and adjust their rights 
equally. 
2. Procedural Aspects of Bankruptcy Code:  Filing Proof of
Claim
Both the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure lay the foundation, rules, and procedures for 
bankruptcy proceedings.  To initiate a bankruptcy proceeding, 
the first step requires a debtor to file a bankruptcy petition.21  
Although there are various types of bankruptcies, individual 
debtors may file Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy, depending 
on their specific circumstances.22  Once the debtor files for 
bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed to perform various tasks, such 
as object to improper proofs of claim and distribute the debtor’s 
estate.23 
In response to the bankruptcy petition, creditors file a proof 
of claim to assert their claims against the debtor.24  For example, 
a creditor with a judgment or lien against the debtor would 
assert his or her right by filing a proof of claim in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Bankruptcy Rule 3001 requires the 
following information to be included in the proof of claim: 
(1) name of entity from whom the creditor purchased the account;
(2) entity that held debt as of the last transaction; (3) date of last
transaction; and (4) date of last payment.25  If a creditor files a
20 See In re Ampal-American Israel Corp., 502 B.R. 361, 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (stating that the automatic stay also protects creditors against other creditors 
attempting to “jump the line”). 
21 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1002. 
22 Bankruptcy, U.S. CTS., www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2017). 
23 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012); see also 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2012). 
24 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (“A proof of claim is a written statement setting 
forth a creditor’s claim.”). 
25 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c)(3)(A)(i)-(v) (basing claims on open-ended or 
revolving consumer credit agreements). 
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proof of claim, it is prima facie evidence of the validity and 
amount of the claim.26  Accordingly, the burden is placed on the 
debtor or the bankruptcy trustee to object to a filed proof of 
claim.27  If they fail to do so, under the automatic allowance 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the claim is allowed.28 
However, if the debtor does object to a proof of claim, he 
must follow the procedure laid out under Rule 3007 of the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.29  To object to a 
creditor’s claim, the debtor must file a written objection with 
notice of a hearing to allow the bankruptcy court to determine 
whether to exclude the claim.30  The bankruptcy court has 
authority, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), to modify the amount 
of the claim or exclude it altogether.31 
Should there be any misconduct during this process, the 
bankruptcy courts are also endowed with powers to remedy bad 
faith conduct and sanction its actors under Bankruptcy Rule 
9011 and § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.32  The bankruptcy 
court’s authority to sanction extends to creditors that file 
improper proofs of claim.33  Bankruptcy Rule 9011 allows the 
bankruptcy court to impose sanctions on the parties if they file 
documents with the court that are either frivolous, in bad faith, 
or motivated by an improper purpose.34  Essentially, this rule is 
the functional equivalent of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.35  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court may sanction any 
party that violates this provision under Rule 9011(c).36 
Further, the bankruptcy courts possess an even broader 
inherent power to sanction legal misconduct under § 105(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.37  The scope of § 105(a) extends beyond the 
purview of Bankruptcy Rule 9011; it allows the bankruptcy court 
26 In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225, 237 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 3001(f)). 
27 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
28 Id. 
29 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007. 
30 Id. 
31 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2012). 
32 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). 
33 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. 
34 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; see also In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 
1995). 
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
36 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. 
37 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). 
2016] PRECLUDING FDCPA CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY 1069 
to issue any order that is “necessary or appropriate” to 
implement the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and prevent 
abuse of its process.38  Bankruptcy courts generally exercise their 
power under § 105 when parties engage in conduct that 
“intentionally abuse[s] the judicial process in an unreasonable 
and vexatious manner.”39 
Accordingly, bankruptcy courts are vested with broad 
authority to regulate and sanction the legal misconduct of parties 
appearing before them. 
B. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA as a subsection of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act (“CCPA”) in an effort to protect 
consumers from abusive debt collection practices.40  In doing so, 
many procedural safeguards, such as the debt validation process 
under § 1692g and the “mini-Miranda” warning requirement, 
were set in place. 
1. Purpose of FDCPA Is Consumer Protection
Congress enacted the FDCPA after it determined that the
existing laws and procedures were inadequately protecting 
consumers from abusive debt collector conduct.41  Under the 
FDCPA, debtors are given a private right of action to bring suit 
against offending debt collectors.42  The FDCPA’s primary 
scheme places open-ended prohibitions upon creditors.43  These 
open-ended prohibitions may essentially be divided into two 
categories: (1) “false or misleading representations,”44 and 
(2) “unfair practices.”45
38 Id.; see also In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 658 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
39 Collins, 250 B.R. at 657 (quoting In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1047 (7th 
Cir. 2000)). 
40 See Dant, supra note 7, at 1070. 
41 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (2012). 
42 Kara B. Schissler, Note, Come and Knock on Our Door: The Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act’s Intrusion into New York’s Summary Proceedings Law, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 315, 348 (2000). 
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f (2012). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
45 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 
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In addition to open-ended prohibitions, the FDCPA is a 
strict-liability statute.46  Therefore, a plaintiff does not need to 
prove knowledge, intent, nor actual damages to have a successful 
claim.47  Creditors who violate the FDCPA may be liable for 
actual damages, statutory damages up to $1,000, and reasonable 
attorney fees and costs.48 
Traditionally, courts have construed the statute very broadly 
in an effort to protect all consumers, ranging from the most 
“shrewd” to the most “gullible.”49  To effectuate this goal, courts 
use the “least sophisticated consumer standard” when 
determining whether an FDCPA violation exists.50  In general, 
federal circuit and district courts have held that a debt collector 
bringing a civil action to collect on stale debt per se violates the 
FDCPA.51 
However, one limitation of the FDCPA is that it does not 
regulate all creditor conduct; rather, it applies only to “debt 
collectors” within the meaning as defined by the statute. 
Pursuant to § 1692a of the FDCPA, “[t]he term ‘debt collector’ 
means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of 
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or 
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 
asserted to be owed or due another.”52  The statute proceeds by 
listing six groups of creditors exempt from debt collector status.53 
46 Derek S. Burrell, The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: An Overview 
Rx for Debt Collector Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 27 (1996) (discussing the strict 
“mini-Miranda” warning requirement and how its strategic placement or 
concealment on notices will cause debt collectors to be held strictly liable under the 
FDCPA). 
47 In re Broadrick, 532 B.R. 60, 65 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). 
48 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012). 
49 Broadrick, 532 B.R. at 65 (quoting Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar, 
503 F.3d 504, 509 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
50 See United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135–36 (4th Cir. 
1996) (discussing that most courts apply the “least sophisticated consumer” standard 
to evaluate violations of the FDCPA). 
51 See Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(stating that filing a suit after the statute of limitations on a claim had run violates 
the FDCPA); Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(recognizing that a majority of courts have held that threatened or actual litigation 
to collect on a stale debt violates the FDCPA); Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 F.3d 779, 
783, 787 (5th Cir. 2011) (same). 
52 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). 
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A)–(F). 
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Accordingly, the purpose of the FDCPA is to protect 
consumers against the abusive actions of debt collectors.  This is 
accomplished by holding debt collectors strictly liable for 
violating any of its broadly interpreted open-ended prohibitions. 
However, inasmuch as it seeks to protect all consumers, the 
reach of the FDCPA does not regulate all creditor conduct. 
2. Procedural Aspects of the FDCPA
In addition to imposing open-ended prohibitions on debt
collectors, the FDCPA requires debt collectors to comply with two 
important procedural aspects.  First, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g outlines 
the debt validation procedure for circumstances where a 
consumer wants to dispute the validity of a debt.  Second, 
§ 1692e(11) mandates a “mini-Miranda” warning to be placed
upon specific communications sent by the debt collector.
Debt validation, under § 1692g, requires the debt collector to 
send the consumer a written communication notifying him of his 
right to obtain a verification of the debt.54  One of the underlying 
purposes of this requirement is to target the debt-buying 
industry—debt collectors who purchased the debt from the 
original creditor, but collect on the debt under a different name.55  
Through verification, the debt collector must disclose the name 
and address of the original creditor and provide supporting 
documentation of the debt.56  Debt collectors must comply with 
this process after making any “initial communication[s]” with the 
consumer.57  However, under the statute, “formal pleading[s]” are 
exempt and do not constitute an initial communication under the 
FDCPA.58 
In addition, a second procedural requirement of the FDCPA 
is the “mini-Miranda” warning.59  Debt collectors are mandated 
to disclose their intent to collect a debt and warn the consumer 
54 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012). 
55 Elizabeth Lea Black, Construction and Application of Provision of Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act Relating to Validation of Debts (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692g), 150 
A.L.R. Fed. 101, 2a (1998).
56 § 1692g(b).
57 § 1692g(a). 
58 § 1692g(d). “Initial communications” and “formal pleadings” are not defined 
within the statute. 
59 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012). 
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that any information obtained will be utilized for that purpose.60  
Similar to the debt validation procedure, this provision also 
exempts “formal pleading” from compliance.61 
Accordingly, both the debt validation and mini-Miranda 
warning provisions serve to protect consumers through 
mandatory disclosure.  However, both provide the same exception 
to formal pleadings. 
II. VARIOUS APPROACHES COURTS HAVE UTILIZED
Courts addressing the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Code 
necessarily precludes FDCPA claims based on improper proofs of 
claim have taken various positions.  On one end of the spectrum, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has 
concluded that FDCPA claims are not precluded.  On the other 
end, the Second and Ninth Circuits have disagreed and held that 
FDCPA claims are precluded.  The Eighth Circuit, however, has 
taken an intermediate approach in an effort to harmonize both 
federal statutes and held that the FDCPA is only implicated in 
specific circumstances. 
A. Eleventh Circuit and the State Court Analogy of “Unfairness”
The Eleventh Circuit found that the Bankruptcy Code did
not preclude FDCPA claims.  In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, 
LLC,62 the Eleventh Circuit held that filing a proof of claim in a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding to collect on a stale debt 
violated the FDCPA for the same reasons it would violate the 
FDCPA in an ordinary state court action.63  Using this state court 
analogy, the court reasoned that the automatic allowance 
provision in the Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to take unfair 
advantage of unsophisticated debtors and collect payments on 
stale debt.64 
In Crawford, plaintiff owed a debt to a furniture company.65  
The debt collector purchased this debt from the furniture 
company in 2001; the statute of limitations subsequently expired 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014). 
63 Id. at 1262; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2012). 
64 Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1262. 
65 Id. at 1256. 
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in 2004.66  In 2008, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and 
the debt collector filed a proof of claim to collect on the debt 
despite the fact that the statute of limitations had expired four 
years earlier.67  Neither plaintiff nor the bankruptcy trustee 
objected to the proof of claim.68  After four years of making 
payments towards the claim, plaintiff objected to the claim and 
initiated a lawsuit alleging that the debt collector violated the 
FDCPA by filing a proof of claim for stale debt.69  The case 
eventually made its way to the Eleventh Circuit after the district 
court affirmed dismissal of her claim.70 
To start its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit examined both the 
underlying purpose and open-ended prohibitions of the FDCPA.71  
Specifically, it emphasized the “unfair practices” prohibition 
under the FDCPA.72  The court stated that threatening to sue or 
filing a lawsuit to collect a stale debt would constitute a per se 
violation of the FDCPA in state court.73  In state court, stale suits 
are considered unfair under the FDCPA for several reasons: 
(1) unsophisticated debtors may unsuspectingly acquiesce to the
lawsuit as they are unaware that they may assert a statute of
limitations defense; (2) the plaintiff’s recollection of the validity
of the debt is dulled with the passage of time; and (3) given the
amount of time that has passed, the plaintiff may no longer have
personal records regarding the allegedly owed debt.74  Through
this line of reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the
importance of the statute of limitations in guarding against these
unfair outcomes in civil litigation.75
This same principle is equally applicable in the bankruptcy 
context.76  Particularly, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the 
automatic allowance provision, under 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)–(b) and 
Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f), which automatically allows a claim 
66 Id. (stating that Alabama statute of limitations of three years governed this 
debt). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1259. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1257. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1258. 
73 Id. at 1259. 
74 Id. at 1260 (quoting Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 
(7th Cir. 2013)). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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against a Chapter 13 debtor unless there is an objection from 
either the debtor or the trustee.77  As is what happened in this 
case, under the bankruptcy rules, a debt collector may file a proof 
of claim asserting a stale debt and still be able to collect on a debt 
that would otherwise be unenforceable in court if both the debtor 
and trustee fail to object to it.78  Accordingly, filing a proof of 
claim for a stale debt produces the same unfair consequences as 
in state court.  Given the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic allowance 
provision, the debt collector was able to collect payment from the 
plaintiff’s future wages as part of the Chapter 13 repayment plan 
when the debt collector would not otherwise be able to enforce 
such a right through litigation.79  Further, even if a debtor were 
to object, objecting to a proof of claim would cause him or her to 
expend resources and energy similar to filing a limitations 
defense in state court.80 
The debt collector argued that allowing an FDCPA claim in 
this circumstance would contradict the automatic stay provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6);81 essentially, the 
court’s holding would imply that a proof of claim is a form of debt 
collection activity prohibited by the stay.82  The Eleventh Circuit 
rejected this argument by distinguishing between direct and 
indirect methods of debt collection.  As an indirect means of debt 
collection, filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding does 
not come into conflict with the automatic stay.83 
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit concluded by analogy 
that since the debt collector would be liable under the FDCPA 
claim in state court, he is similarly liable under the FDCPA in 
bankruptcy court.84 
77 Id. at 1261. 
78 Id. at 1259. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1261. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1261–62. 
84 Id. at 1262. 
2016] PRECLUDING FDCPA CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY 1075 
B. Second and Ninth Circuits Found That the Bankruptcy Code
Precludes FDCPA Claims
The Second and Ninth Circuits found that the Bankruptcy
Code precluded FDCPA claims.  The Second Circuit, in Simmons 
v. Roundup Funding, LLC,85 reasoned that the underlying
purpose of the FDCPA is not implicated in the bankruptcy
context.86  The bankruptcy court offers sufficient protection to a
debtor when it presides over a debtor’s bankruptcy case.
Therefore, it is unnecessary and contrary to any expressed intent
by Congress to have the FDCPA serve as a supplement to the
remedies already provided for in bankruptcy.87  In fact, in In re
Chaussee,88 the Ninth Circuit found that the allowance of FDCPA
might even run to the detriment of the Bankruptcy Code.89
1. Second Circuit: Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC90
In Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, the Second Circuit
held that a proof of claim stating the incorrect amount owed 
could not form the basis of an FDCPA claim.91  The plaintiff in 
Simmons filed for bankruptcy in 2007.92  The debt collector filed a 
proof of claim for a debt in the amount of $2,039.21.93  The 
plaintiffs objected to the proof of claim and the Bankruptcy Court 
ultimately modified the amount to $1,100, an amount the 
plaintiffs admitted that they owed.94  The plaintiffs subsequently 
brought a class-action lawsuit in district court against the debt 
collector, alleging an FDCPA violation for misrepresenting the 
amount of debt owed.95  In response, the debt collector moved to 
dismiss the complaint arguing that an FDCPA claim could not be 
based on an inflated proof of claim.96  The district court agreed 
with the debt collector and dismissed the complaint. 
85 622 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
86 Id. at 95–96. 
87 Id. at 96. 
88 399 B.R. 225 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008). 
89 Id. at 236–37 (quoting Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 
(9th Cir. 2002)). 
90 See generally Simmons, 622 F.3d 93. 
91 Id. at 96. 
92 Id. at 94. 
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Upon appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the legislative 
history of the FDCPA.97  Citing several decisions from other 
district courts, the Second Circuit concluded that filing a proof of 
claim in bankruptcy court was not the type of abusive conduct 
contemplated by the FDCPA and, therefore, could not be the 
basis for an FDCPA action.98  In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Second Circuit reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code already 
provided sufficient protection to the debtors against abuses that 
the FDCPA sought to protect.99  Due to the supervision of the 
court, discharge of the debt, and the protections afforded by 
bankruptcy to debtors, the underlying purpose of the FDCPA was 
no longer implicated.100 
Further, the Second Circuit justified its approach by stating 
that the Bankruptcy Code provided adequate remedies to an 
aggrieved debtor, which could include revoking an improper proof 
of claim or utilizing the court’s contempt power.101  However, 
instead of seeking a remedy under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
plaintiffs immediately commenced an action under the FDCPA.102  
The Second Circuit reasoned that filing an FDPCA claim was 
potentially more lucrative for the plaintiff than seeking remedy 
from the bankruptcy courts.103  “[N]othing in the FDCPA 
suggest[ed] that it is intended as an overlay to the protections 
already in place in the bankruptcy proceedings.”104  Accordingly, 
the Second Circuit held that the only recourse that debtors who 
fall victim to fraudulent proofs of claim have is through the 
Bankruptcy Code itself.105  Recourse through the FDCPA is 
foreclosed. 
97 Id. (“Congress acted with the aim of eliminating abusive practices in the debt 
collection industry, and also sought to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain 
from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.”). 
98 Id. at 96. 





103 Id. (quoting Gray-Mapp v. Sherman, 100 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 (N.D. Ill. 
1999)). 
104 Id. 
105 See id. (“While the FDCPA’s purpose is to avoid bankruptcy, if bankruptcy 
nevertheless occurs, the debtor’s protection and remedy remain under the 
Bankruptcy Code.” (quoting Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th 
Cir. 2002))). 
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2. Ninth Circuit: In re Chaussee and Its Reliance on Walls v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.106
In Chaussee, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code
precluded the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims.107  The plaintiff, who 
filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, had commenced an action 
against the debt collector alleging various violations including an 
FDCPA claim.108  The two credit card debts in dispute were 
assigned to the debt collector from a collection agency.109  The 
debt collector subsequently filed two proofs of claim in the 
plaintiff’s bankruptcy case with inadequate supporting 
documentation.110 
The plaintiff commenced an action against the debt collector 
alleging that: (1) they violated both the state Consumer 
Protection Act (“the CPA”) and FDCPA because the debts were 
barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) they were attempting 
to collect on a debt that she did not owe, as a different name was 
listed as the account holder.111  The debt collector subsequently 
moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing neither the CPA nor 
FDCPA were applicable to proofs of claim in bankruptcy 
proceedings.112  Further, the debt collector argued that plaintiff’s 
exclusive remedy for challenging a proof of claim was to object to 
it pursuant to the relevant Bankruptcy Rules.113  Their motion 
also contended that plaintiff had already obtained adequate relief 
pursuant to § 502(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code when the 
bankruptcy court excluded the debt collector’s proofs of claim.114 
The Bankruptcy Court, relying on Walls v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A.,115 held that the Bankruptcy Code precluded the 
plaintiff’s FDCPA claims.  The facts in Walls are rather 
straightforward.  A Chapter 7 debtor, who was able to keep her 
home, continued to make payments on her mortgage despite 
106 See generally In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008). 
107 Id. at 227. 
108 Id. 





114 Id. at 228–29 (“[A]n order was entered by the bankruptcy court on December 
18, 2007, sustaining the objection and disallowing [the debt collector’s] claims.”). 
115 276 F.3d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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having it discharged in bankruptcy.116  When the debtor later 
stopped making payments on the mortgage, the debt collector 
foreclosed.117  In response, the debtor brought a class action in 
federal court alleging FDCPA violations that the debt collector 
attempted to collect on a discharged debt.118  The Walls court 
dismissed the action, stating that the Bankruptcy Code 
precluded the FDCPA claim.119 
Identifying that the source of the FDCPA claim was a 
violation of § 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Walls court 
reasoned that allowing an FDCPA claim would be unnecessary 
for three reasons: (1) the bankruptcy court’s power under § 105 of 
the Bankruptcy Code remedies § 524 violations;120 (2) allowing 
FDCPA claims in these circumstances would subject the district 
court to “bankruptcy-laden” determinations, which would be 
irrelevant to the FDCPA;121 and (3) allowing an FDCPA claim 
would essentially create a back door for debtors to circumvent the 
bankruptcy’s remedial scheme.122  The Walls court found that the 
legislature intended to design the Bankruptcy system as a forum 
to “adjust all the rights and duties of creditors and . . . debtors 
alike” and not to allow debtors to circumvent this remedial 
scheme through the FDCPA.123  Accordingly, the Walls court 
concluded that, although federal statutes should be read jointly 
when possible, the Chapter 7 debtor’s remedies were limited to 
those provided under the Bankruptcy Code because to hold 
otherwise would circumvent the nature of the Bankruptcy 
Code.124  Adopting the Walls approach, finding that the 
Bankruptcy Code “represents a ‘whole system’ designed to 




119 Id. at 235–36. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 235 (quoting Walls, 276 F.3d at 510). 
122 Id. at 235–36 (“This would circumvent the remedial scheme of the Code 
under which Congress struck a balance between the interests of debtors and 
creditors by permitting (and limiting) debtor’s remedies for violating the discharge 
injunction to contempt.”). 
123 Id. at 236 (quoting Walls, 276 F.3d at 510 (citation omitted)). 
124 Id. (citing Walls, 276 F.3d at 510). 
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comprehensively define all rights and remedies of debtors and 
creditors,” the Ninth Circuit in Chaussee held that the FDCPA is 
precluded.125 
The plaintiff, relying on Randolph v. IMBS, Inc.,126 urged the 
Court to rule similarly and allow her FDCPA claim.127  The Court 
rejected Randolph and held that it was bound by precedent to 
apply the Walls reasoning instead.128  However, in dicta, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that it would nevertheless reject Randolph’s 
reasoning as inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.129  The 
Ninth Circuit proceeds with comparing the differing procedural 
aspects between the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA, 
specifically the automatic allowance provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the FDCPA validation requirements, respectively.130  
For example, the automatic allowance provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt, when asserted in a proof 
of claim, is valid unless the debtor affirmatively objects to it.131  
In contrast, under the FDCPA’s scheme, the debtor’s failure to 
contest the validity of the debt does not constitute an admission 
of liability.132  Accordingly, in light of such a direct contradiction, 
the Court concluded that it could not reconcile both the statutory 
schemes of the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA.133 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit found that attempts to comply 
with both statutory schemes would result in confusion.  For 
example, under the debt validation provision of the FDCPA, the 
debt collector is mandated to send a notice informing the debtor 
of his or her right to dispute the debt.134  Upon receiving the 
notice, a debtor would be uncertain whether to dispute the debt 
under the procedures laid out under the FDCPA or object to the 
claim through the bankruptcy process.135  The Ninth Circuit was 
125 Id. at 241. 
126 368 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding no direct conflict between the 
Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA and allowing plaintiff’s FDCPA claim to proceed). 
127 Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 237. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 237–38. 
131 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
132 Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 238; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(c) (2012). 
133 Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 239. 
134 Id. at 238; see also § 1692g. The Court even points out the ambiguity as to 
whether proofs of claim would be required to comply with § 1692g. Chaussee, 399 
B.R. at 238. 
135 Chaussee, 399 B.R. at 239. 
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unable to reconcile the validation process under the FDCPA and 
the claims objection process under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Consequently, it concluded that Congress did not intend for the 
FDCPA to apply to proof of claims filed in bankruptcy court.136 
In arguing for the allowance of her FDCPA claim, the debtor 
contended that the Bankruptcy Code did not rectify the debt 
collector’s misconduct in filing an improper proof of claim—
something that the FDCPA strict-liability approach targets.137  
Specifically, she argued that the Bankruptcy Code provided 
inadequate protection by allowing debt collectors to assert 
unenforceable claims and then subsequently placing an 
unreasonable burden, in terms of fees and costs, on the debtor to 
object to them.138  The Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that 
objecting to improper proofs of claim is overly burdensome 
because a debtor may object to a claim by merely filing a single-
page document after conducting a claims analysis, which is, in 
any event, presumably completed under the ordinary course of 
bankruptcy proceedings regardless.139 
Further, the debtor asserted that recovery, under 
Bankruptcy Rule 9011, posed a greater difficulty than the strict-
liability standard as established under the FDCPA.140  The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this contention because—although the remedies 
provided by Bankruptcy Rule 9011 should be sufficient—under 
§ 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts are
inherently vested with power to remedy patterns of bad faith
conduct that extend beyond the reach of Bankruptcy Rule
9011.141  With this, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
Bankruptcy Code adequately deterred abuse of the bankruptcy
process and provided relief to aggrieved debtors.142  As a result,





139 Id. at 239–40. 
140 Id. at 240. 
141 Id. at 240–41. 
142 Id. at 241. 
143 Id. 
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C. Eighth Circuit’s Intermediate Approach
The Eighth Circuit in In re Gatewood144 explicitly rejected
the holdings of both Crawford and Simmons.145  Instead, the 
Eighth Circuit adopted the rationale of a lower court by holding 
that filing an accurate proof of claim containing all relevant 
information, including the timing of the debt, is not a violation of 
the FDCPA.146 
The facts in Gatewood are very similar to those in Crawford.  
The plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2013 and, in 
response, the debt collector filed a proof of claim for a stale 
medical debt.147  The plaintiffs failed to object to the proof of 
claim and entered into a repayment plan where the debt collector 
participated in collecting monthly payments.148  During that 
time, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the debt 
collector, asserting violation of the FDCPA.149 
In rejecting Crawford and Simmons, the Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that both cases did not adopt the “cardinal principle of 
construction,” which is to give effect to both federal statutes.150  
Findings of an automatic violation or complete preclusion of the 
FDCPA, as held in Crawford and Simmons, respectively, run 
contrary to the goal of harmonizing both the FDCPA and 
Bankruptcy Code.151  Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit adopted an 
intermediate approach by limiting the FDCPA’s applicability to 
only specific circumstances.152  Since the FDCPA prohibits false 
and misleading practices, filing an accurate proof of claim and 
disclosing all relevant information does not implicate the 
FDCPA.153 
144 533 B.R. 905 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015). 
145 Id. at 909–10 (quoting Broadrick v. LVNV Funding LLC (In re Broadrick), 
532 B.R. 60, 75 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2015)). 
146 Id. at 910. 
147 Id. at 906. The two-year statute of limitations had already expired. Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 910 (quoting Broadrick, 532 B.R. at 74). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. (specifying that the FDCPA “simply prohibits false, misleading, deceptive, 
unfair, or unconscionable debt collection”). 
153 Id. 
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III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIMITING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
FDCPA 
Several reasons justify limiting the FDCPA’s applicability in 
the context of proofs of claim.  Some reasons include: (1) debt 
collectors’ inability to simultaneously comply with requirements 
of the Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA; (2) allowing FDCPA claims 
may have a detrimental effect on the Bankruptcy Code; (3) debt 
collectors are denied an opportunity for the Bankruptcy Court to 
adjudicate their claims; and (4) lastly, the misplaced concerns 
against the preclusion of FDCPA claims. 
A. Simultaneous Compliance with the FDCPA and Bankruptcy
Code Is Not Feasible
The FDCPA should be inapplicable to improper proofs of
claim because simultaneous compliance with both federal 
statutes is not feasible.  The strongest example being that the 
FDCPA’s mini-Miranda notice requirement directly conflicts with 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Under the FDCPA, debt collectors must 
place a mini-Miranda warning that discloses their intent to 
collect a debt.154  Generally, failure to include the mini-Miranda 
warning constitutes an FDCPA violation.155  However, the plain 
language of the mini-Miranda warning violates the automatic 
stay of the Bankruptcy Code because debt collectors are 
purporting to collect on a debt.156  As a result, debt collectors 
would be faced with an impermissible choice: leave the mini-
Miranda warning off and violate the FDCPA, or include the mini-
Miranda warning and violate the Bankruptcy Code.157 
Further, even in a scenario where debt collectors are 
somehow able to comply with both the Bankruptcy Code and 
FDCPA when filing their proof of claim, debtors would be left 
with a confusing choice when disputing the validity of a claim: 
should they object to the claim under § 502 of the Bankruptcy 
154 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012). The mini-Miranda warning requires debt 
collectors to disclose that they are “attempting to collect a debt and that any 
information obtained will be used for that purpose.” Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2012). 
157 See Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(stating that debt collectors would be faced with a conflict between Bankruptcy Code 
and the FDCPA); see also Torres v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 530 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2015) (discussing Simon’s rationale for direct conflict between Bankruptcy
Code and FDCPA).
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Code or bring a claim under the FDCPA?158  Accordingly, the 
direct conflict between both the federal statutes necessitates the 
preclusion of the FDCPA in the context of filing proofs of claim in 
a bankruptcy proceeding. 
Other circuit courts addressing this same issue have found 
that the direct conflict between the FDCPA and Bankruptcy 
Code necessitates an inference of an implied statutory repeal of 
the FDCPA.  Specifically, the Third Circuit, in Simon v. FIA 
Card Services, N.A.,159 held a strong position that courts must 
read federal statutes together unless there is a “positive 
repugnancy.”160  Even holding that there is a strong inference 
against implied statutory repeal, the Simon court, when 
considering the same contradiction between the mini-Miranda 
requirement of the FDCPA and the automatic stay provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code, could not reconcile both federal statutes.161  
Accordingly, it held that such a direct conflict was sufficient 
enough to produce a finding that an FDCPA claim for failure to 
include a mini-Miranda notice was precluded.162 
B. Detrimental Effect on the Bankruptcy Code
The bankruptcy courts are endowed with broad powers to
remedy any potential creditor misconduct,163 allowing debtors to 
bring FDCPA claims would potentially render some of its powers 
obsolete.  As explained earlier in this Note, Bankruptcy Rule 
9011 is essentially identical to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure; it allows the bankruptcy courts to sanction 
abuse of the process.164  Further, if needed, the bankruptcy courts 
158 In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225, 238–39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the 
confusion that would ensue because debtors would not know whether to use the 
Bankruptcy Code or FDCPA to remedy wrongful proofs of claim). 
159 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013). 
160 Id. at 274 (“ ‘[W]hen two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of 
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to 
regard each as effective.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–44 (2001))). 
161 Id. at 280. 
162 Id. 
163 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c) (“[T]he court may . . . impose an appropriate 
sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) 
or are responsible for the violation.”); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) (“The court may issue 
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of this title.”); see also supra Section I.A.2. 
164 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c). 
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also have an even broader inherent authority under 
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to sanction parties for conduct that is beyond 
the reach of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and similar statutes.165  Two 
examples illustrate how FDCPA claims can render the 
bankruptcy court’s powers useless. 
First, the allowance of FDCPA claims to supplement the 
relief offered by bankruptcy courts raises the concern of the 
bankruptcy court’s power under 11 U.S.C. § 502 being obsolete. 
For example, it is likely that debtors will no longer resort to the 
bankruptcy court to exclude an objectionable proof of claim when 
they are able to bring their own private right of action to hold the 
debt collector strictly liable for damages.166  In another instance, 
debtors who fail to properly review and object to improper proofs 
of claim under the bankruptcy process may bring an FDCPA 
claim to recover on their own negligence.  As a result, the 
bankruptcy court’s power under 11 U.S.C. § 502 may be rendered 
useless.  The allowance of FDCPA claims against improper proofs 
of claim incentivizes debtors to forego the standard bankruptcy 
process and resort to the FDCPA’s strict-liability scheme. 
Second, the Walls court followed this same line of reasoning 
and determined that the exclusive remedy should rest with the 
Bankruptcy Code.167  In Walls, the debtor commenced an FDCPA 
action for a creditor’s violation of discharge injunction on her 
mortgage.168  Although the Bankruptcy Code already provides 
civil contempt under § 105(a) as an enforcement mechanism for 
violations of the discharge injunction, the debtor resorted only to 
the FDCPA.169  Finding that her FDCPA claim was precluded, 
the Walls court held that allowing FDCPA would circumvent the 
remedial scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.170 
Accordingly, the application of FDCPA claims in the context 
of improper proofs of claim may negatively impact the existing 
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code rather than supplement it. 
165 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
166 See Dant, supra note 7, at 1084. 
167 Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002). 
168 Id. at 504. 
169 Id. 
170 Id at 510. (“To permit a simultaneous claim under the FDCPA would allow 
through the back door what Walls cannot accomplish through the front door—a 
private right of action.”). 
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C. Debt Collectors Would Receive Differential Treatment and
Rights
By allowing FDCPA actions to be brought for filing proofs of
claim asserting stale debt, debt collectors would be given 
differential treatment and rights depending on their status under 
the FDCPA.  First, because the FDCPA does not apply uniformly 
to all creditors, some creditors risk FDCPA liability while others 
will not.  Second, the expiration of the statute of limitations does 
not extinguish a creditor’s rights to a debt, only his or her 
remedy.171  Therefore, by allowing FDCPA actions, certain 
creditors are effectively prevented from asserting their valid 
right to payment in the form of a proof of claim. 
Creditors in bankruptcy courts would be faced with unequal 
treatment; some will be sanctioned under the Bankruptcy Code 
while others will face FDCPA liability for essentially the same 
types of violations.  As stated before, not all creditors fall within 
the meaning of “debt collector,” as defined by the statute.172  For 
example, a private individual who does not qualify as a debt 
collector may still file a proof of claim asserting a stale debt 
against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  As a result, nondebt-
collector creditors would still be able to assert stale claims 
without fear of liability under the FDCPA.  This inconsistent 
treatment of creditors for the same violations will cause 
additional confusion for courts in determining the proper course 
of action and assessing damages. 
Further, if FDCPA claims are allowed, debt collectors are 
prevented from asserting their valid right to payment.  The 
expiration of the statute of limitations does not extinguish the 
creditor’s rights to the debt, only his or her remedy.173  This is 
unlike statutes of repose, which are substantive, and extinguish 
both the right and the remedy.  Statutes of limitation, in 
contrast, are considered to be procedural only and function to 
extinguish only the remedy.174  As such, a debt collector’s right to 
payment still exists even after the statute of limitations has 
171 In re Broadrick, 532 B.R. 60, 74 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). 
172 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 
173 Jones v. Methodist Healthcare, 83 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). 
174 Id. 
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expired.175  Accordingly, by ruling that a proof of claim asserting 
a stale debt is a violation of the FDCPA, courts have effectively 
prevented creditors from filing legitimate claims to the detriment 
of the claim-determination process.176 
D. Concerns Raised Against the Preclusion of FDCPA Claims
Are Misplaced
Various arguments that have been advanced in support for
allowing FDCPA actions be brought against creditors who file a 
proof of claim asserting a stale debt are misguided.  Specifically, 
the unfairness analogy that the Crawford court employed did not 
account for fundamental differences between state and 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Also, the presumption against repeal by 
implication is rebuttable when two federal statutes directly 
conflict with one another. 
1. Unfairness Analogy from State Court Proceedings
The concern raised in Crawford, allowing debt collectors to
file a proof of claim asserting stale debt is “unfair,” is 
unfounded.177  The crux of the concern is that the proof of claim 
would mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing that it 
was an enforceable debt—given the passage of time and the 
consumer’s likely unawareness of the limitations defense—using 
the same rationale employed by state courts.178  In addition, the 
concern of misleading unsophisticated consumers is further 
strengthened by the exponential increase in pro se bankruptcy 
filings in recent years.179 
175 Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 699 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (“That 
a claim is not allowable because a statute of limitation has expired does not defeat 
the existence of the claim in bankruptcy.”). 
176 See id. A debtor may even have an interest in having a stale debt paid in 
bankruptcy; for example, a co-signor may be rendered responsible for payment. See 
In re Gatewood, 533 B.R. 905, 910 n.4 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015). 
177 Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). 
178 Id. 
179 Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other 
Debtor Relief, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/ 
litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html; see 
also Torres v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 530 B.R. 268, 275 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (discussing the 
concern raised in Crawford that debtors may be forced to settle lawsuit to avoid 
litigation costs); Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 
2013) (stating that even if a debtor knows to use the limitations defense, they will be 
more inclined to settle the debt in order to avoid costs and embarrassment). 
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However, many key distinctions between the nature of the 
bankruptcy courts and state courts illustrate the flaw in merely 
analogizing the unfairness aspect of filing a lawsuit in state court 
to filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy.180  Some distinctions 
include: (1) special protections in bankruptcy court not found in 
state court; (2) debtor initiates bankruptcy proceeding and 
invites the participation of creditors; and (3) the involvement of a 
trustee.181 
First, bankruptcy court provides special protections to 
debtors that are not afforded to them in state court, such as the 
automatic stay, bankruptcy discharge of debt, and required 
disclosures for proofs of claim.182  As stated above, the automatic 
stay prevents the creditor from liquidating the debtor’s assets.183  
Further, a bankruptcy discharge provides an even broader 
protection than that contemplated by the FDCPA.184  If a debt is 
discharged, a creditor is prevented from even asking for payment 
on a stale debt.185  Lastly, when a creditor files a proof of claim, 
they are required to disclose information such as the date of last 
payment, the date of last transaction, and the name of the entity 
that the debt was owed to at the time of last transaction.186  
Therefore, this leaves the debtor in a superior position to identify 
stale debts at the outset of the bankruptcy.187  As such, 
bankruptcy courts vastly differ in protections offered to the 
debtor than in state courts. 
Second, the bankruptcy process is not similar to a state court 
lawsuit as the debtor initiates the proceeding and invites the 
participation of creditors.  In contrast, state court proceedings 
are generally commenced against the debtor, and they must 
affirmatively assert the statute of limitations defense. 
180 See Broadrick v. LVNV Funding LLC (In re Broadrick), 532 B.R. 60, 69 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2015) (summarizing the state analogy raised by the Crawford 
court). 
181 See Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010); FED. 
R. BANKR. P. 1002(a) (stating that the debtor files a proof of claim to initiate the
process); 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
182 See Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the supervision of 
the court and its officers provides adequate protection and does not require the 
FDCPA to supplement it). 
183 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
184 In re Broadrick, 532 B.R. 60, 71 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 72. 
187 Id. 
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Oftentimes, a pro se debtor may not know of the limitations 
defense and run the risk of inadvertently waiving it.  In 
bankruptcy, the debtor is not required to take affirmative action 
as the bankruptcy trustee generally reviews and objects to proofs 
of claim.188  This is another key distinction between bankruptcy 
and state court proceedings that upends any analogy between the 
two. 
Lastly, in addition to the special protections mentioned 
above, a trustee is appointed to safeguard the interests of the 
debtor.189  As discussed before, a trustee is charged with specific 
duties such as administering the estate, objecting to claims, and 
furnishing information concerning the estate.190  No trustee is 
automatically appointed for debtors to perform similar tasks in 
state court.  The presence of a trustee further contributes to the 
difference in the nature of bankruptcy proceedings. 
Accordingly, given the vastly different natures of the two 
proceedings, the unfairness aspect cannot be merely analogized 
to a bankruptcy context. 
2. Presumption Against Federal Repeal by Implication
It is well established that finding an implicit repeal or
preemption of a federal statute is generally disfavored.191  This 
same principle is especially applicable in the context of 
bankruptcy.  In Butner v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court grappled with an issue concerning whether a 
federal rule in equity or state law governed the right to use rents 
collected during bankruptcy.192  In reaching a conclusion, the 
court held in the absence of a specific bankruptcy interest or 
provision, bankruptcy courts will take non-bankruptcy rights as 
they are found.193  Accordingly, given the presumption against 
188 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2012); see also Broadrick, 532 B.R. at 73. 
189 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5). 
190 11 U.S.C. § 704(a). 
191 See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 619 
F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that there is a presumption against finding
an implicit federal repeal because it requires a court to speculate as to legislative
intent).
192 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Although the Bankruptcy Act 
has been superseded by the Bankruptcy Code, the proposition articulated in Butner 
still stands. 
193 Id. at 55 (“Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no 
reason why such interests should be analyzed should be analyzed differently simply 
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”). 
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finding a repeal by implication and Butner’s philosophy, courts 
are generally reluctant to find that the FDCPA has no 
applicability in the bankruptcy context.194 
However, both these doctrines recognize that in light of a 
direct contradiction, the presumption against repeal by 
implication is rebutted.195  As explained above, certain aspects of 
the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code directly contradict with one 
another and cannot be reconciled.196  As a result, even courts that 
have taken a position against implying preemption have 
recognized that there is an irreconcilable conflict between both 
federal statutes.  However, this Note argues that a solution 
exists without requiring courts to resort to repeal by implication 
of the FDCPA. 
IV. EXPANSION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
To resolve the present issue, this Note proposes that courts 
should take various actions to limit the applicability of the 
FDCPA in the context of filing proofs of claim without having to 
resort to repeal by implication.  First, courts should extend the 
“formal pleading” exemption, under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11) and 
1692g(d), to encompass proofs of claim.  Second, courts should 
hold that absent additional factors such as fraud or 
misrepresentation, a proof of claim asserting a stale debt does 
not implicate the FDCPA. 
A. Extend the “Formal Pleading” Exemption To Include Proofs
of Claim
Courts should extend the “formal pleadings” exemption,
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d) of the FDCPA, to 
include proofs of claim.  By extending this exemption, debt 
collectors filing a proof of claim will not have to comply with the 
mini-Miranda and debt validation requirements of the FDCPA. 
Therefore, the direct contradictions and confusion associated 
194 See Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(discussing the inference against finding a federal repeal by implication). 
195 Id. 
196 For discussion on how courts have been unable to reconcile the contradiction 
between the FDCPA mini-Miranda warning requirement and the Bankruptcy’s 
automatic stay, see supra text accompany note 150. 
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with complying with both the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code will 
be eliminated without resorting to repeal by implication of the 
FDCPA. 
Both §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d) set forth requirements that 
conflict with the Bankruptcy Code’s scheme.  As discussed 
earlier, § 1692e(11) requires debt collectors to place a mini-
Miranda warning on certain communications and § 1692g sets 
forth a debt validation process.197  However, both provisions 
conflict with aspects of the Bankruptcy Code.198  By utilizing the 
form pleadings exemption found in both provisions of the 
FDCPA, the obligations will not be triggered and creditors will 
not be held liable under the FDCPA for failure to include them 
when filing a proof of claim.  As a result, the direct conflict 
between the Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA will be eliminated. 
Several lower federal courts have held that proofs of claim 
constitute a “formal pleading” for purposes of the FDCPA.199  The 
weight of authority has held that filing a proof of claim is 
seemingly analogous to filing a complaint.200  Just as litigants file 
a complaint in civil actions, creditors file a proof of claim in 
bankruptcy actions.  Accordingly, to resolve any direct conflicts 
that the FDCPA notice requirements impose upon debt collectors 
attempting to file a proof of claim, courts should hold that a proof 
of claim is considered a “formal pleading” within the purview of 
the FDCPA. 
197 See 11 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 1692g. 
198 See supra Section III.A. (discussing how the mini-Miranda warning conflicts 
with the automatic stay and how the debt validation process confuses debtors in 
challenging the validity of a claim). 
199 See Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating 
that “[a] debt collector could not satisfy the FDCPA by including the notice of rights 
in a proof of claim, because ‘a communication in the form of a formal pleading’ is not 
an ‘initial communication’ under the FDCPA”); In re McCarther-Morgan, No. 07-
90654, 2009 WL 7810817, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2009) (holding that the 
“formal pleading” exception included proofs of claim); In re F.C.M. Corp., No. 87-
0946-CIV-DAVIS, 1987 WL 364456, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1987) (stating that 
filing a proof of claim is the equivalent of filing a complaint); Nortex Trading Corp. v. 
Newfield, 311 F.2d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 1962) (same); In re Brosio, 505 B.R. 903, 912 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (same). 
200 See In re Franchi, 451 B.R. 604, 607 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (“Courts 
routinely recognize that the filing of a proof of claim is analogous to the filing of a 
complaint.”); In re Cont’l Airlines, 928 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
filing a proof of claim is analogous to filing a complaint in a civil action). 
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This alternative solution is significant because it allows for 
compliance with both federal statutes without inferring repeal of 
the FDCPA.  It achieves this result and also avoids the direct 
conflict between the FDCPA notice requirements and the 
automatic stay completely.  By holding that the “formal 
pleadings” exception applies to proofs of claim, the judicial 
inclination against repeal by implication can be avoided 
altogether.201 
In conclusion, courts should hold that the formal pleadings 
exemption, under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d), apply to 
proofs of claim.  As such, this will resolve certain contradictions 
without implying that the FDCPA be implicitly repealed in the 
bankruptcy context. 
B. Proofs of Claim Asserting a Stale Debt Should Not Constitute
a Per Se Violation of the FDCPA
In addition, courts should hold that filing a proof of claim,
even when asserting a debt, should not constitute a per se 
violation of the FDCPA absent any additional factors.  By using 
this approach, courts may be able to maximize the effect of both 
federal statutes while eliminating the issue of debtors resorting 
to the FDCPA over the Bankruptcy Code. 
Courts should hold that a proof of claim asserting a stale 
debt, without additional factors, does not constitute an automatic 
violation of the FDCPA.  If the only impediment to the proof of 
claim is the expiration of the statute of limitations, the FDCPA 
should not be implicated and the debtor’s only remedy is through 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Absent additional factors such as 
misrepresentation of information or other deceptive conduct, the 
FDCPA should not be implicated.  The underlying rationale 
being that, in rejecting the unfair analogy from state court,202 
filing a proof of claim and giving full disclosure of the timing of 
the debt does not constitute false or misleading behavior that the 
FDCPA seeks to remedy.203 
201 See supra Section III.C.2. (discussing repeal by implication as not favorable 
as a concern against preclusion of the FDCPA). 
202 Section 1692f of the FDCPA provides that “[a] debt collector may not use 
unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1692f (2012) (emphasis added). 
203 Section 1692e provides that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of 
any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (emphasis added). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
adopted this same approach in In re Gatewood.204  Although the 
Eighth Circuit held that an accurate proof of claim, disclosing all 
relevant information, does not automatically violate the FDCPA, 
it did not clearly articulate what situations would implicate 
FDCPA liability.205  Accordingly, courts should expand upon the 
Gatewood court’s reasoning and hold that situations involving 
misrepresentation, deception, and omission of relevant facts may 
constitute a violation of the FDCPA. 
The importance of this approach allows both the federal 
statutes to function as intended without significant interference 
with one another.  Further, this prevents a court from implying 
that the FDCPA is partially or completely repealed in the 
bankruptcy context.  Debt collectors can still incur FDCPA 
liability if they resort to deceptive tactics such as misinformation 
or omission of relevant information.  However, if they candidly 
disclose the timing of their debt, given the supervision of the 
court, and the presence of a trustee, this cannot be regarded as 
unfair under the meaning of the FDCPA. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Note argues that the FDCPA should be 
inapplicable in the context of filing proofs of claim.  However, 
recognizing that implied repeal of federal statutes is generally 
disfavored, this Note offers some alternative solutions to 
addressing this issue.  First, courts should hold that proofs of 
claim fall within the “formal pleading” exceptions to avoid 
requirements under §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d) of the FDCPA. 
Second, courts should find that filing a proof of claim for a stale 
debt, by itself, does not constitute “unfair or unconscionable” or 
“false or deceptive” conduct as contemplated by the FDCPA. 
Accordingly, this avoids the implied repeal of the FDCPA while 
achieving the same, and arguably more efficient, result. 
204 In re Gatewood, 533 B.R. 905 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015). 
205 Id. at 910. 
